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The weather prediction (WP) task is a probabilistic category learning task that was designed
to be implicit/procedural. In line with this claim, early results showed that patients with
amnesia perform comparably to healthy participants. On the other hand, later research
on healthy adult participants drew attention to the fact that the WP task is not necessarily
implicit.There have been results showing that participants can access structural information
acquired during the task. Participants also report that their responses are based on
memories and rule knowledge. The contradictory results may be reconciled by assuming
that while explicit learning occurs on the WP task in case of adults, in children the learning
process is implicit. The present study aims at testing this hypothesis. Primary school
children completed the WP task; the experimental group performed the original task,
whereas in the control group cues and outcomes were associated on a random basis,
hence their version of theWP task lacked a predictive structure. After each item, participants
were asked whether they relied on guessing, intuition, “I think I know the answer” type
of knowledge, memories of previous items, or knowledge of rules. Self-insight reports of
the experimental group were compared to a control group. Results showed that children
learn similarly to adults: they mostly (but not completely) rely on explicit, and not on implicit
processes.
Keywords: implicit learning, explicit learning, probabilistic categorization, weather prediction task, children,
development, self-insight
SELF-INSIGHT IN PROBABILISTIC CATEGORIZATION – NOT
IMPLICIT IN CHILDREN EITHER
Traditionally cognitive psychology interprets human memory as a
fractionated system. A crucial differentiation is related to our abil-
ity to consciously access stored representations; representations
that may be accessed consciously are considered explicit, while
those that are unavailable for conscious access are implicit. Pre-
vious studies employed a number of different methods to assess
implicit learning, which is deﬁned as the incidental acquisition of
complex information with the inability of verbal recall (Reber,
1993). Some of these methods – e.g., the serial reaction-time
task (Nissen and Bullemer, 1987) or artiﬁcial grammar learning
(Reber, 1967) – focus on the acquisition of sequential regularities,
while others test categorization. The current study uses the latter
approach, and employs the weather prediction (WP) task (Knowl-
ton et al., 1996). In the WP task, participants receive one, two or
three out of four different cues. Their goal is to guess whether
there would be rain or sunshine. Unknown to the participants,
each cue is associated with the outcomes with a given probability.
During the task, participants’ performance improves from chance
to 70–80% correct.
Early results on the WP task were obtained from neuropsycho-
logical patients. One of the greatest appeals of implicit learning
paradigms is that they show that patients with amnesia are able to
acquire environmental information despite their severe declarative
deﬁcit. Early studies using the WP task demonstrated that early in
the task the performance of patients with amnesia is comparable
to that of healthy participants, but in the later phases their learn-
ing effect disappears. At the same time, they show a ﬂoor effect
on the debrieﬁng questions (including questions about the num-
ber of different cues, Knowlton et al., 1994). Amnesic patients are
often contrasted with patients of Parkinson’s disease (PD), who
can be characterized with an impaired implicit memory system.
In accordance, PDpatients show the opposite pattern as theAmne-
sia group: their performance on the debrieﬁng task is identical to
that of healthy participants, while their categorization is not better
than chance, especially in the early phases of the task (Knowlton
et al., 1996). These results suggest that early in the task partici-
pants rely on their procedural systems, while the later phases tap
declarative memory. This hypothesis is identiﬁed as the “implicit
ﬁrst hypothesis” (Kemény and Lukács, 2013).
Subsequent neuropsychological studies focused on qualitative
analysis of the learning process and hypothesized a different map-
ping between performance andmemory systems. A study by Gluck
et al. (2002) identiﬁed three different types of strategies, the “one-
cue strategy,” the“singleton strategy,” and the“multi-cue” strategy.
In the case of the one-cue strategy, participants focus on a spe-
ciﬁc cue and give a consistent answer in the presence of that
cue, but respond randomly when it is absent. In the case of
the singleton strategy, participants respond consistently if there
is only one-cue in the item, but respond randomly in the case
of combinations. The multi-cue strategy is the optimal strategy.
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Participants using the multi-cue strategy focus on all appearing
cues, they analyze each cue, combine the mean predictive value
and make a decision based on the average. The two subopti-
mal strategies are similar, since in both cases participants need
to focus on one-cue at a time (single strategies), while in the opti-
mal strategy they focus on all cues present. According to Gluck
et al. (2002) this difference in complexity leads to differences in
explicitness: strategies using one-cue at a time are easy to ver-
balize, hence they can be considered explicit, while the multi-cue
strategy is difﬁcult to verbalize, hence it is expected to be implicit.
Note that strategy use by itself is surmised to be implicit: Gluck
et al. (2002) demonstrated a lack of correlation between real strat-
egy use and self-insight on strategy use. Healthy participants are
expected to develop an initial single strategy, and switch to the
optimal multi-cue strategy later on. There is neuropsychologi-
cal evidence supporting this “strategy hypothesis”: results show
that patients with hypoxia have difﬁculties in developing the basic
(explicit) strategies, while PD patients are capable of develop-
ing explicit strategies, but are unable to switch to more advanced
cue-utilization.
A different line of research tested the relationship between
performance and self-insight. If performance is in line with
self-insight, the processes involved are considered explicit, while
incongruence reﬂects implicit functioning. Previous studies of the
WP task found that while participants show consistent strategy
use, they are mostly unable to report it, and even if they do
report strategy use, it is very unlikely they report the one they
had actually employed (Gluck et al., 2002). However, this result
does not necessarily reﬂect implicit learning as self-reports only
reveal strategy use, no structural information is collected about
acquired representation (in the current case: about the strength
of association between cues and outcomes). Subsequent experi-
mental studies, however, did test structural knowledge (Lagnado
et al., 2006; Newell et al., 2007). In two experiments Lagnado et al.
(2006) tested blockwise (Experiment 1) and itemwise (Experi-
ment 2) whether participants are able to give an account of the
predictive value of each cue, and how important they ﬁnd the cues
in prediction. Results showed that participants learned the strong
predictive cues very early, and soon realized the importance of
these cues. Weak cues were learned later and were considered less
important. These results show that healthy participants rely on
explicit mechanisms during the WP task.
Experiment 2 by Newell et al. (2007) provided similar results:
in this study participants faced one of two versions of the WP task
and had to provide the same probability and cue-usage ratings
as in the Lagnado et al. (2006) study. The two versions of the
WP task were feedback-based and observational. The former was
identical to the one used in previous studies, while in the latter
participants were not required to guess the weather as cues and
outcomes were shown simultaneously. The former is considered a
procedural, while the latter a declarative version of the WP task.
Results were similar in both conditions and were also in concert
with the previous study: participants learned the stronger cues ﬁrst
and reported that these stronger cues were more important. These
studies support the so-called explicit hypothesis (see Kemény and
Lukács, 2013), since they suggest that learning on the WP task is
completely explicit.
The Lagnado et al. (2006) and Newell et al. (2007) studies focus
on structural information. That is, these studies collect infor-
mation from participants about their knowledge. An interesting
phenomenon that previous studies have shown is that – despite
their severe difﬁculties with declarative learning – patients with
amnesia are able to develop some kind of structural knowledge:
they can provide information on how cues and outcomes are
related to each other (Reber et al., 1996).
A previous study by Dienes and Scott (2005) looked at
whether participants were conscious that their judgment consti-
tuted knowledge, and also conscious of the structural regularities
that enabled those judgments. Dienes and Scott tested partici-
pants with an artiﬁcial grammar learning task. Participants had
to report whether they relied on guessing, intuition, pre-existing
knowledge, task-based memories or task-based rule-knowledge
during each grammaticality judgment. In a previous study we
adapted this method to the WP task (Kemény and Lukács,
2013); there was no sign of the involvement of implicit pro-
cesses in learning on the WP task. Participants did not perform
better than chance with “implicit” type of answers (“guessing,”
“intuition,” “I think I know the answer”), while on items asso-
ciated with “explicit”-type of answers (“I remember,” “I know
the rule”) their performance was high. In sum, studies testing
conscious access tend to show that learning on the WP task is
explicit.
THE CURRENT STUDY
In spite of the extensive literature on different aspects of learning
on theWP task, relatively little is known about children’s strategies.
In the current studywe tested children on theWP task and also col-
lected self-insight reports after each decision to ﬁnd out whether
the task is suitable for measuring implicit learning in children. As
explained above, there are three hypotheses concerning learning
on the WP task. The implicit ﬁrst hypothesis (Knowlton et al.,
1994) suggests that learning is implicit in the early phases of the
task and it only becomes explicit in the later phases. Following
this assumption, one expects the number of explicit self-insight
reports to continuously increase with time. However, one should
also expect above chance performance on early items with implicit
responses.
The second option is the strategy hypothesis (Gluck et al.,
2002). This theory expects participants to differ in their explicit
awareness of the strategy they use. Users of the single strategies
are expected to show explicit awareness, while users of the multi-
cue strategy should solve the task in an implicit manner. Based on
this account one expects more implicit answers for the multi-cue
strategy. Another possibility is that the number of implicit answers
is comparable for both strategies, but performance is higher for
implicit items in multi-cue users and for explicit items in single
strategy users.
The third account is the explicit hypothesis (Lagnado et al.,
2006; Newell et al., 2007) which suggests that learning is explicit
throughout the WP task. This account predicts the number of
explicit answers to be consistent throughout the task, but per-
formance is expected to improve with time. At the same time,
performance on guessing and intuition items (implicit class) are
not expected to be better than chance. Another possibility is that
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the number of explicit items increases with explicit-associated per-
formance constantly above, and implicit-associated performance
constantly at chance level.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Fifty-seven children participated in the study. All children were
pupils of one of two primary schools, their mean age was 9.79
(SD = 1.36, min = 6.92, max = 12.58). Children were randomly
assigned to one of the two conditions (28 in the experimental
and 29 in the control condition). Prior to the study, parents of
participants provided a written informed consent in accordance
with the principles set out in the Declaration of Helsinki and the
stipulations of the local institutional review board. All participants
were tested individually in a quiet room in their school.
DESIGN AND STIMULI
From the participants’ perspective the two conditions were identi-
cal. Participants had to solve a WP task (identical to the one used
in Kemény and Lukács, 2010; based on Knowlton et al., 1994) in
which one, two or three out of four different cues were shown, and
they had to decidewhether the cue combinationwould lead to sun-
shine or rain. Below the cues there were two images: one showing
sunshine, the other showing rain. Participants had to click on the
image representing the assumed outcome. Immediately after their
response feedback was provided: the incorrect answer disappeared
and only the correct outcome remained on the screen along with
the cues, and it also disappeared after 1500 ms.
We collected subjective self-insight measures after each item
(through a procedure based on Dienes and Scott, 2005; identical to
the one used in Kemény and Lukács, 2013). Participants faced the
following question: “How sure were you in your decision?” Using
themouse, participants had to answer by clicking on a straight line.
Five statements were indicated above the line: “I was guessing,”
“It was intuition,” “I think I know the answer,” “I remember the
answer,”“I know the rule.”1 As soon as the participant provided a
response a new item appeared.
The design of the WP task is identical to the one used in previ-
ous studies by Kemény and Lukács (2010, 2013). There were two
conditions: an experimental and a control condition. In the exper-
imental condition there were two strong and two weak cues for
each outcome. Cue1 was a square predicting sunshine in 85.7%
of the time (note that all other appearances led to rain); Cue2
was a triangle associated with sunshine in 70% of cases; Cue3
was a pentagon predicting rain in 70% of the time; and Cue4
was a rhombus associated with rain in 85.7% of cases. Chil-
dren in the control condition faced a very similar task: the cues
and cue-combinations were presented in the same order as in
the experimental condition, but each cue and cue-combination
was randomly associated with the outcomes. Table 1 provides
the predictive value of each cue and cue-combination in the
two tasks. Participants faced four blocks of 50 trials, trials were
in the same pseudorandom order for all participants with the
restriction that no combination could appear in two consecutive
trials.
1Note that both the question and the statements were in Hungarian.
RESULTS
DATA ANALYSIS
Accuracy in the WP task is the ratio in which participants make
the correct prediction based on the combined probability. That is,
if cues 1 and 3 are present, the average predictive value of sunshine
is (85.7 + 70)/2 = 77.85%, which is above chance level, hence we
take sunshine as a correct response. Correct responses are based
on predictive values and not on feedback. Hence it is possible that
an answer is correct even if it is not the same as the outcome.
In self-insight reports, there are ﬁve different response cate-
gories. In order to analyze performance associated with the ﬁve
categories (guess, intuition, think, remember, rule) by the early
(Block 1) and late (Block 4) phases valid data in all 10 cells is
required. Previous studies (Dienes and Scott, 2005; Kemény and
Lukács, 2013) reported that this pattern of data was only available
for a small number of participants. For this reason, categories are
combined into classes: one in which participants had explicit rep-
resentations on the basis of their knowledge (explicit category),
and one in which they did not have any (implicit category). The
latter involves the guess and intuition, while the former involves
the remember and rule reports. think-type answers are analyzed
as a separate, transitional class. This analysis requires valid data in
all six cells. Some participants however did not meet this criterion,
and those who had empty cells were excluded from all analyses. As
a result, all analyses presented below include data from ﬁfteen par-
ticipants in the experimental condition and seventeen participants
in the control condition.
Previous studies highlighted the importance of different strate-
gies in the WP task (Gluck et al., 2002; Hopkins et al., 2004;
Shohamy et al., 2004). According to these studies, the implicit
Table 1 |Types and occurrences of cues or cue-combinations per
blocks of 50 trials in the two conditions.
Cues Frequency Experimental
condition
Control
condition
A 8 0.875 0.5
B 4 0.75 0.5
C 4 0.25 0.5
D 8 0.125 0.5
AB 8 0.875 0.5
AC 1 1 1
BC 2 0.5 0.5
BD 1 0 0
CD 8 0.125 0.5
ABC 2 1 0.5
ABD 1 1 1
ACD 1 0 0
BCD 2 0 0.5
The ﬁrst column (Cues) shows which cues are present in a given combination: A
is cue1, B is cue2, C is cue3, D is cue4. Frequency is the number of appearances
within a block of 50 trials. The third and fourth columns provide the probability
that the given cue or combination leads to sunshine in the two conditions.
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vs. explicit nature of learning differs according to the strategy
used. In the following section we present analyses comparing the
self-insight of participants using different strategies. The identiﬁ-
cation of the strategies is identical to previous studies (Gluck et al.,
2002; Kemény and Lukács, 2013): a model score (see equation 1)
is computed for each strategy. multi-cue strategy is granted if the
model score for the multi-cue strategy is below 0.1. If the multi-
cue model score is above 0.1, but one of the single strategy model
scores is below 0.1, we assume that single strategy was used. If no
model scores are below 0.1, we do not attribute any strategy. To
avoid multiple analysis of the same data, we tested strategy use
on results from Block 2 (this analysis is identical to Kemény and
Lukács, 2013).
ModelScoreM =
∑
P(#sun_expected P,M − #sun_actualP)2∑
P(#presentationsP)
2
(1)
LEARNING PERFORMANCE
Learning performance was only analyzed in the experimental
group, as there was no probabilistic structure in the control
condition. There was a monotonic increase in performance, illus-
trated by a signiﬁcant linear polynomial trend, F(1,14) = 11.827,
p < 0.01, η2p = 0.458. Figure 1 shows performance by block for
both the experimental and the control group.
COMPARING EARLY AND LATER BLOCKS IN TERMS OF SELF-INSIGHT
BY CONDITION
As explained above, the implicit-ﬁrst hypothesis suggests that
learning on the WP task is implicit in the beginning and becomes
explicit later on (Knowlton et al., 1994,1996). The strategyhypoth-
esis predicts the reverse pattern (Gluck et al., 2002). Similarly, to
our previous study (Kemény and Lukács, 2013) we identify Block
1 as the “early phase,” and Block 4 as the “late phase.” First we
compare the number of different answers given by the two groups.
A 2 × 3 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with Block
(early vs. late) and answer-type (implicit vs. think vs. explicit)
as within-subject variables and condition (experimental vs. con-
trol) as between subject variable. As the analysis is conducted on
FIGURE 1 | Hit rates in the two conditions throughout the four blocks
in the experimental and the control group. Error bars indicate Standard
Errors.
the number of cases, the number of cases in each Block (48) and
each condition (192) is invariant (note that there were two items
with a predictive value of 0.5 in each block; as there is no correct
prediction for these items, they were excluded from the analysis).
Results showed that therewas a signiﬁcantmain effect of answer
type, F(2,60) = 9.224, p < 0.001,η2p = 0.235. Bonferroni corrected
post hoc tests revealed that the number of implicit answers are
signiﬁcantly higher than both the number of think-type answers
(p < 0.00033) and the number of explicit answers (p < 0.016). The
number of explicit and think-type answers did not differ fromeach
other signiﬁcantly (p = 0.214). No other effect was signiﬁcant. The
Block × Type interaction was approaching signiﬁcance, but since
it does not reﬂect condition-based changes, it is not discussed any
further. Figure 2 provides the number of implicit vs. think vs.
explicit answers by Block and by condition.
CATEGORIZATION PERFORMANCE ASSOCIATED WITH SELF-INSIGHT
TYPE BY CONDITION AND BY BLOCK
In the next step we tested whether participants’ performance
differed by answer type. That is, whether the observed perfor-
mance in the two groups differed based on their association with
implicit or explicit self-report. A 2 × 3 × 2 repeated measures
ANOVA was conducted with Block (early vs. late) and answer type
(implicit vs. think vs. explicit) as within-subject variables and con-
dition as between-subject variable. The dependent variable was
performance, which is the mean ratio of correct answers.
Results revealed that performance differed in the two con-
ditions, as shown by a signiﬁcant main effect of condition,
F(1,30) = 9.393, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.238. Data shows that per-
formance of the experimental group was higher than that of the
control group. See Figure 1 for details. Results also showed that
this advantage was not stable in time, as revealed by a signiﬁ-
cant Block × Condition interaction, F(1,30) = 6.375, p < 0.05,
η2p = 0.175. At the same time, the main effect of Block was not sig-
niﬁcant, p = 0.114. There was a signiﬁcant main effect of answer
type, F(2,60) = 3.521, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.105. Bonferroni corrected
post hoc comparisons revealed that performance on the explicit
items was signiﬁcantly higher than performance on the implicit
items (p < 0.016). No other difference was signiﬁcant (p = 0.45
FIGURE 2 |The number of implicit and explicit type of answers in
Blocks 1 and 4 by condition. Error bars indicate Standard Errors.
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for implicit and think answers, p = 0.868 for think and explicit
answers). No other effects were signiﬁcant (all ps > 0.1).
To further analyze theBlock×Condition interaction, a separate
one-way ANOVA was conducted for each Block with condition
as between-subject variable. The ANOVA revealed no signiﬁcant
difference between the groups on Block 1, p = 0.304, while the
experimental group performed signiﬁcantly higher on Block 4,
F(1,30) = 13.129, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.304.
To test the pattern of learning in the experimental group, per-
formance associated with each answer-type in each Block was
analyzed using a one-sample t-test with a target value of 50%.
Results showed that performance on implicit-associated items
did not differ from chance in both Block 1, t(14) = −0.716,
p = 0.486, and Block 4, t(14) = 1.572, p = 0.138. In Block
1, performance only marginally differed from chance for both
think and explicit-associated items, t(14) = 1.907, p = 0.077 and
t(14) = 1.975, p = 0.068, respectively. In Block 4 both think and
explicit-associated performance was signiﬁcantly above chance,
t(14) = 2.535, p < 0.05 and t(14) = 4.058, p < 0.01 respectively.
Figure 3 provides performance associated with each answer-type
in both Blocks.
SELF-INSIGHT BY STRATEGY USE IN BLOCK 2
Whereas in the previous analyses we compared data blockwise
(and thus on the time elapse from the onset of the task), in the next
session we analyze differences in self-insight by different strategy-
use. Gluck et al. (2002) suggests that single strategies are easy to
verbalize, hence they are explicit, while the multi-cue strategy
is implicit. To avoid multiple analysis of the same dataset, we
computed strategy use on Block 2. In the following analyses, only
those participants of the experimental condition were considered,
who used either of the single strategies or the multi-cue strategy.
Out of the 15 participants in the experimental group who were
analyzed earlier, ﬁve participants developed a single strategy, and
four developed the multi-cue strategy.
A 3 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA was used with answer
type (implicit vs. think vs. explicit) as within-subject variable
FIGURE 3 | Performance of the experimental group associated by
answer-type in Block 1 and Block 4. Error bars indicate Standard Error.
and strategy-use (single vs. multi-cue) as between-subject vari-
able. Similarly, to the above analysis, values by strategy-use were
invariant. The ANOVA revealed no signiﬁcant differences (all
ps > 0.654).
CATEGORIZATION PERFORMANCE ASSOCIATED WITH SELF-INSIGHT
TYPE BY STRATEGY USE IN BLOCK 2
Next we tested performance associated with implicit vs. think
vs. explicit answers by strategy use. A 3 × 2 repeated mea-
sures ANOVA was conducted with answer type (implicit vs. think
vs. explicit) as within-subject variable, and strategy use (single
vs. multi-cue strategy) as between-subject variable. The ANOVA
revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of strategy, F(1,7) = 115.432,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.943, with the multi-cue users performing
signiﬁcantly higher than single strategy users. No other effects
were signiﬁcant (both ps > 0.327). Data on implicit vs. think
vs. explicit-associated performance by strategy use is provided in
Figure 4.
Figure 4 shows that in multi-cue users all three answer types
were associated with above chance performance. To statistically
conﬁrm this observation, we conducted separate one-sample
t-tests on performance related to each of the three answer types.
The target value was 50%. Results showed that all three perfor-
mancemeasures differed from chance level: for implicit-associated
items t(3) = 4.917, p < 0.05, for think-answers t(3) = 4.823,
p < 0.05, and for explicit-associated items t(3) = 27.13, p < 0.001.
DISCUSSION
The current study was designed to test whether implicit processes
underlie learning on the WP task. Results are equivocal: there was
no support for the implicit ﬁrst hypothesis (Knowlton et al., 1996).
No signiﬁcant Block by answer type by condition interaction was
observed in either the analysis of the number of responses or the
analysis of self-insight related performance.
There is no support for the strategy hypothesis (Gluck et al.,
2002) either, as there was no group difference in the number
of implicit vs. think vs. explicit self-reports. Results on perfor-
mance measures show that single strategy users do in fact rely
FIGURE 4 | Performance associated with implicit or explicit self-insight
in Block 2 for multi-cue vs. single-cue strategists. Error bars indicate
Standard Errors.
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on explicit mechanisms. multi-cue users, on the other hand, uti-
lize explicit strategies much more effectively: their explicit-related
performance is higher than that of the single strategy users. The
strategy hypothesis predicts high implicit and low explicit perfor-
mance for the multi-cue users. The results do not conﬁrm this
prediction, as performance is slightly higher for the explicit items:
there is a general advantage of multi-cueusers for both implicit and
explicit knowledge. An interesting ﬁnding, however, is that multi-
cue users show above chance performance for implicit-associated
items. This was not found in adults, and it will be discussed in
detail below.
On the other hand, results are in line with the predictions of the
explicit hypothesis (Lagnado et al., 2006; Newell et al., 2007) since
the experimental group shows random performance for implicit-
associated items, but a well above chance performance for the
explicit-associated ones. This is contrasted with the control group,
where participants did not perform better than chance in either
type of items. This interpretation is in concert with previous adult
data (Kemény and Lukács, 2013), and suggests that children rely
on explicit processes while solving the WP task.
As explained in the introduction, the central aim of the cur-
rent study was to investigate whether the WP task is a suitable task
for testing implicit learning in children. The results do not sup-
port this hypothesis. Similarly, to adult data, children generally
report that they rely on explicit processes when they solve the task.
On the other hand – contrary to adults – they also demonstrate
an effect of implicit learning, albeit minimal. Our data is in line
with previous studies from structural knowledge. As described
above, Lagnado et al. (2006) and Newell et al. (2007) argued that
participants rely on explicit processes on two grounds: (1) the
majority of the participants used a multi-cue strategy very early
in the task already, and (2) participants report a reliance on the
stronger cues in the early phases, and only later do they turn to
use weaker cues. While both results support the involvement of
explicit processes, they do not seem to be in line with each other:
one cannot use a multi-cue strategy by relying on only two cues
that are combined infrequently. The limitation of the Lagnado
et al. (2006) study is that they did not measure self-insight. That
is what motivated Kemény and Lukács (2013) to adapt the self-
insight methodology of Dienes and Scott (2005). Results provided
further evidence for the assumption of Lagnado et al. (2006) that
(1) there is no qualitative difference between multi-cue and sin-
gleton strategies, and (2) the quantitative difference between the
strategies shows that themulti-cue strategy is simplymore effective
than the singleton strategies, and relies more strongly on explicit
processes.
IMPLICIT PROCESSES IN MULTI-CUE USERS
While results do not support the strategy hypothesis, they draw
attention to an interesting phenomenon: multi-cue using chil-
dren perform above chance for implicit-associated items. That is,
while our previous study with adults (Kemény and Lukács, 2013)
showed no signs of implicit learning at all, and the current study
also showed that results in general are in line with the explicit
hypothesis, children’s data suggest the involvement of implicit
process too. This is especially important in the light of the fact
that implicit answers provide one third of responses (18.35 on
average, in contrast with a mean of 14.05 think and 18.35 explicit
answers). This pattern was not observed in our previous study of
adults: in two experiments multi-cue using adults showed approx-
imately the same number of implicit and explicit decisions, with
near-chance performance on implicit-associated items (51.99 and
50.45% in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, respectively2).
These results raise the following questions: how can we explain
that the ﬁrst two analyses show no implicit learning, while the
second two analyses provide evidence for a strong implicit com-
ponent? How can we account for the presence of implicit learning
in children, but not in adults?
Analyses 1 and 2 contrasted all participants of the experimental
and control groups. That is, an experimental group of seventeen
and a control group of 22 children were compared. Analyses 3
and 4 on the other hand contrasted users of different strategies
in the experimental group. The number of children using dif-
ferent strategies is very low: four children were able to develop
multi-cue strategy, while six participants used one of the single
strategies. That is, the above chance implicit performance of these
four multi-cue users “melted” into the near-chance performance
of the remaining 13 participants3.
The interesting question concerns age-related changes in the
implicitness of learning. There are signs of implicit learning in
children, but not in adults. Considering the competitive dual sys-
tems approach (Poldrack et al., 1999, 2001) one could argue that
explicit learning in adults ismore advanced than in children, hence
adults do not require implicit mechanisms for solving theWP task,
but children do. This would be in line with previous neuropsycho-
logical studies showing that when explicit mechanisms are not
available (in Amnesia), patients rely on implicit processes. How-
ever, since we only tested children, and only a small number of
children used a multi-cue strategy, further research is required to
answer this question.
THINK-TYPE ANSWERS
While the classiﬁcation of guessing, intuition, memory and rule-
usage is obvious, think answers were included to make the
transition between the implicit and explicit classes smoother.
In our previous study (Kemény and Lukács, 2013) this type
was a member of the implicit class, as it changed similarly
to other types in the same class: it showed a strong decrease
from Block 1 to Block 2, and a continuous decay even after-
ward, while members of the explicit class showed a reverse effect
(unpublished pretesting data from Kemény and Lukács, 2013).
The current study shows that think-answers behave somewhat
differently from the implicit class. Figure 2 illustrates catego-
rization performance by answer type, and shows that for the
experimental group, think-type answers truly deviate from the
other classes. Pairwise comparisons show that performance asso-
ciated with think answers is marginally higher than performance
2Note that in the previous study (Kemény and Lukács, 2013) think-type answers
were included in the implicit class.
3It is also noteworthy that the Analyses 1 and 2 were conducted on Blocks
1 and 4, while strategy-based analyses were made on Block 2 data. Still,
we could expect that this implicit performance is not unique for Block
2. A new and larger set of data would be required to conﬁrm this
assumption.
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related to implicit answers (p = 0.084), but not different from
explicit-associated performance (p = 0.750). On the other hand,
control participants seem to have a lower performance on think
answers, but no pairwise comparisons were signiﬁcant (both
ps > 0.524).
The analysis of performance related to strategy use revealed
a similar pattern. For multi-cue users, think-answers serve
as a transition (see Figure 4). Post hoc pairwise compari-
son showed that performance associated with this answer type
is not different from performance associated with the other
classes (both ps > 0.346). On the other hand, singleton users
seem to have treated think-answers as responses for unex-
pected errors: results show that think-related performance is
marginally signiﬁcantly smaller than implicit-related performance
(p = 0.055), whereas it does not differ from explicit-associated
performance.
METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS
While the current design is adapted from previous studies using
the same self-insight methodology (Dienes and Scott, 2005;
Kemény and Lukács, 2013), it is still questionable whether
introspection can be considered reliable. In the literature of
implicit learning (see above), it is well-established that behavior
and self-insight are not necessarily correlated. For this rea-
son the current study (similarly to Kemény and Lukács, 2013)
compares responses provided by the experimental group to
a control condition, and deﬁnes explicitness as a deviation
from the baseline, rather than as an absolute measure. This
may minimize the distortion caused by data originating from
introspection.
Another methodological concern is that self-reports are col-
lected after the feedback. The reason for using such a design is
that we wanted to keep cue-outcome units together, as previ-
ous studies (e.g., Maddox and Ing, 2005) showed that increasing
the time asynchrony between cues and outcomes interfere with
implicit categorization. Collecting self-reports after the feedback
may modify response behavior: participants may alter their self-
insight reports based on the outcome. That is, on incorrect
responses they may simply report reliance on guessing while they
in fact followed a strategy that resulted in an incorrect predic-
tion. Vice versa, after guessing led to a correct prediction, they
may report that they actually knew the correct answer. At the
very extreme, this hypothesis would predict a very low (near
0%) performance for implicit items, and a ceiling effect for the
explicit ones, which is not the case. At the same time, the cur-
rent study does not control for the occasional appearance of this
effect.
CONCLUSION
Based on previous results suggesting that theWP task is not neces-
sarily implicit in adults, the current study testedwhether itmaybe a
useful task for the assessment of unconscious learning in children.
While there are traces of implicit processing, data strongly sup-
port the explicit hypothesis. Children, similarly to adults, report
that they relied on memory or knowledge of the rule instead of
guessing and intuition. These results complement previous studies
testing structural knowledge, and demonstrate that the WP task
is not a better measure of implicit learning in children than in
adults.
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